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Abstract.   We  discuss  several  issues  of  statistical  design,  data  collection,  analysis, 
communication,  and  decision  making  that  have  arisen  in  recent  and  ongoing 
coronavirus  studies,  focusing  on  tools  for  assessment  and  propagation  of 
uncertainty.   This  paper  does  not  purport  to  be  a  comprehensive  survey  of  the 
research  literature;  rather,  we  use  examples  to  illustrate  statistical  points  that  we 
think  are  important. 
 
1. Statistics  and  uncertainty 
 
Just  as  war  makes  every  citizen  into  an  amateur  geographer  and  tactician,  a  pandemic  makes 
epidemiologists  of  us  all.   Instead  of  maps  with  colored  pins,  we  have  charts  of  exposure  and 
death  counts;  people  on  the  street  argue  about  infection  fatality  rates  and  herd  immunity  the 
way  that  in  the  past  they  might  have  debated  strategies  and  alliances. 
 
The  severe  acute  respiratory  syndrome  coronavirus  2  (SARS-CoV-2)  pandemic  has  brought 
statistics  and  uncertainty  assessment  to  public  discourse  to  an  extent  rarely  seen  except  in 
election  season  and  the  occasional  billion-dollar  lottery  jackpot.   Statistical  claims  become 
political  claims  and  vice-versa.   As  statisticians  and  epidemiologists,  we  can  try  to  contribute  to 
the  discourse  by  laying  out  some  of  the  challenges  that  arise  in  assessing  uncertainty  and 
propagating  it  through  statistical  analysis  and  decision  making.   We  consider  several  examples 
and  conclude  with  some  general  recommendations. 
 
Statistics  is  key  throughout  the  life  cycle  of  a  scientific  project,  from  design  through  data 
collection  and  analysis,  and  ultimately  through  communication  of  results  for  decision 
recommendations.   In  the  case  of  a  pandemic  like  SARS-CoV-2,  surveillance  data  are  critical  for 
assessment  of  current  status  and  for  future  projection,  and  clinical  measurements  are  vital  for 
evaluating  diagnostic  tests  and  intervention  efficacy.   Design  includes  sample-size  calculations, 
determination  of  comparison  groups,  and  time  horizons,  and  randomization,and   is  critical  in 
research  to  identify  effective  treatments  and  vaccines.  Analysis  includes  evaluation  and 
estimation  based  on  clinical  studies  as  well  as  disease  modeling  studies  for  forecasting  and 
decision  support.   Communication  includes  the  challenge  of  drawing  inferences  and  making 
decisions  based  on  a  variety  of  models  and  data  sources.  Uncertainty  is  present  at  each  step.  
 
2. Data  and  measurement  quality 
 
It  is  becoming  painfully  apparent  that  the  numbers  defining  the  global  burden  of  SARS-CoV-2 
are  at  best  uncertain  and  at  worst  frequently  wrong.   The  bread  and  butter  of  disease 
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surveillance—cases  and  deaths—are  both  suspect,  for  reasons  that  are  only  beginning  to  be 
fully  understood.  Studies  that  rely  on  these  as  inputs,  for  example  for  estimating  transmission 
dynamics  or  case  fatality  rates,  have  commonly  made  the  mistake  of  considering  these 
numbers  as  given  (and  reliable)  and  do  not  account  for  uncertainty  or  bias  in  reporting.  
 
There  has  been  some  compelling  reporting  on  how  the  number  of  deaths  reported  in  the  first 
few  months  of  the  pandemic  far  exceeds  what  would  have  been  expected  at  this  time  of  the 
year,  particularly  in  states  like  New  York.   There  has  also  been  good  reporting  how  the 
differences  across  states  in  reporting  of  covid-related  deaths  may  be  complicating  things 
(Harmon,  2020).   Some  states  have  changed  how  they  classify  a  death  as  due  to  the  virus, 
leading  to  potential  increases  in  death  counts  in  some  cases  (e.g.  Michigan)  and  reductions  in 
death  counts  (e.g.  Colorado).   One  big  question  is  getting  at  how  the  changes  in  test  availability 
and  distribution  both  between  regions  and  groups,  and  over  time  (for  example,  as  a  result  of 
inadequate  infrastructure  and  reagent  shortages),  impacts  our  assessment  of  incidence, 
prevalence,  and  mortality,  conditional  on  age  and  other  demographic  variables.   Larremore  et  al. 
(2020)  deals  with  some  of  the  questions  about  measuring  seroprevalence  but  doesn't  engage 
with  any  of  the  pesky  issues  surrounding  social  bias  in  testing. 
 
One  way  to  address  data  quality  is  to  triangulate.   In  a  clinical  study,  a  hospital  can  perform 
antibody  tests  and  RT-PCR  RNA  tests  on  patients.   In  a  study  tracking  symptoms,  data  can  be 
collected  from  multiple  sources,  as  in  the  Carnegie  Mellon  project  that  tracks  Facebook  and 
Google  surveys,  hospital  records,  web  searches  and  flu  tests  (Rosenfeld  et  al.,  2020). 
 
When  measurements  cannot  be  easily  calibrated,  inferences  can  be  sensitive  to  assumptions; 
for  example,  the  controversial  Stanford  antibody  study  (Bendavid  et  al.,  2020,  Gelman  and 
Carpenter,  2020)  was  sensitive  to  the  assumed  sensitivity  and  specificity  of  the  antibody  test. 
 
These  issues  are  no  less  pronounced  when  contemplating  population-level  transmission 
dynamics.  The  basic  reproduction  number,  ,  and  its  cousin  the  effective  reproduction  number, R0
,  which  measures  the  actual  number  of  infections  generated  by  an  average  case,  are  often R
cited  as  measures  of  epidemic  control..   However,  it  is  easy  to  forget  that  and    are  not R0 R 
empirical  quantities.  They  are  estimated  on  the  basis  of  surveillance  data,  which  as  noted 
above,  is  not  as  reliable  as  we  might  wish  to  believe.  In  addition,  is  a  function  of  (a)  the R 
per-contact  infectiousness  of  each  individual,  and  (b)  the  rate  at  which  those  contacts  occur. 
Reduce  either  or  both  of  these  and  you  are  likely  to  reduce  the  rate  of  spread.   Both  are  subject 
to  between-individual  variation,  due,  for  example,  to  variable  compliance  with  social  distancing 
efforts,  variation  in  the  extent  of  viral  shedding,  age  specific  differences  in  contact  and 
infectiousness.  This  variation  is  widely  understood  in  infectious  disease  epidemiology,  and  there 
are  theoretical  and  statistical  modeling  frameworks  that  allow  us  to  account  for  inter-individual 
variability  in  susceptibility  and  infectiousness.  
 
Drivers  of  variation  in  infectiousness  and  susceptibility  at  an  individual  or  population  level  can  be 
studied  using  a  hierarchical  approach.   In  this  area,  there  are  at  least  three  key  dimensions  of 
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uncertainty  that  we  need  to  consider:   (1)  What  range  of  values  of  the  average  infectiousness  is 
consistent  with  the  observed  data?   (2)  How  much  between-individual  variation  is  there  in 
infectiousness/susceptibility,  and  how  much  does  it  matter  to  address  it  specifically?   (3)  If  we 
implement  an  intervention  to  reduce  the  value  of  ,  how  can  we  estimate  how  well  it  worked? R0
The  Imperial  College  group  has  fit  some  reasonable  models  (for  example,  Unwin  et  al.,  2020) 
trying  to  untangle  effects  of  different  policies  on  the  spread  of  coronavirus,  making  use  of 
variation  in  space  and  time  of  the  growth  rates  of  the  infection,  
 
3. Design  of  clinical  trials  for  treatments  and  vaccines 
 
Part  of  designing  a  study  is  accounting  for  uncertainty  in  effect  sizes.   Unfortunately  there  is  a 
tradition  in  clinical  trials  of  making  optimistic  assumptions  in  order  to  claim  high  power.   Here  is 
an  example  that  came  up  in  March,  2020.   A  doctor  was  designing  a  trial  for  an  existing  drug 
that  he  thought  could  be  effective  for  high-risk  coronavirus  patients.   He  contacted  one  of  us  to 
check  his  sample  size  calculation:   under  the  assumption  that  the  drug  increased  survival  rate 
by  25  percentage  points,  a  sample  size  of  N  =  126  would  assure  80%  power.    When  we  asked 1
him  how  confident  he  was  in  his  guessed  effect  size,  the  doctor  replied  that  he  thought  the 
effect  on  these  patients  would  be  higher  and  that  25  percentage  points  was  a  conservative 
estimate.   At  the  same  time,  he  recognized  that  the  drug  might  not  work.   We  asked  the  doctor  if 
he  would  be  interested  in  increasing  his  sample  size  so  he  could  detect  a  10  percentage  point 
increase  in  survival,  for  example,  but  he  said  that  this  would  not  be  necessary.  
 
It  might  seem  reasonable  to  suppose  that  a  drug  might  not  be  effective  but  would  have  a  large 
individual  effect  in  case  of  success.   But  this  vision  of  uncertainty  has  problems.   Suppose,  for 
example,  that  the  survival  rate  was  30%  among  the  patients  who  do  not  receive  this  new  drug 
and  55%  among  the  treatment  group.   Then  in  a  population  of  1000  people,  it  could  be  that  the 
drug  has  no  effect  on  the  300  of  people  who  would  live  either  way,  no  effect  on  the  450  who 
would  die  either  way,  and  it  would  save  the  lives  of  the  remaining  250  patients.   There  are  other 
possibilities  consistent  with  a  25  percentage  point  benefit--for  example  the  drug  could  save  350 
people  while  killing  100--but  we  will  stick  with  the  simple  scenario  for  now.   In  any  case,  the 
point  is  that  the  posited  benefit  of  the  drug  is  not  "a  25  percentage  point  benefit"  for  each 
patient;  rather,  it's  a  benefit  on  25%  of  the  patients.   And,  from  that  perspective,  of  course  the 
drug  could  work  but  only  on  10%  of  the  patients.   Once  we've  accepted  the  idea  that  the  drug 
works  on  some  people  and  not  others--or  in  some  comorbidity  scenarios  and  not  others--we 
realize  that  "the  treatment  effect"  in  any  given  study  will  depend  entirely  on  the  patient  mix. 
There  is  no  underlying  number  representing  the  effect  of  the  drug.   Ideally  one  would  like  to 
know  what  sorts  of  patients  the  treatment  would  help,  but  in  a  clinical  trial  it  is  enough  to  show 
that  there  is  some  clear  average  effect.   Our  point  is  that  if  we  consider  the  treatment  effect  in 
the  context  of  variation  between  patients,  this  can  be  the  first  step  in  a  more  grounded 
understanding  of  effect  size.  
1  With  126  people  divided  evenly  in  two  groups,  the  standard  error  of  the  difference  in  proportions  is 
bounded  above  by  √(0.5*0.5/63  +  0.5*0.5/63)  =  0.089,  so  an  effect  of  0.25  is  at  least  2.8  standard  errors 
from  zero,  which  is  the  condition  for  80%  power  for  the  z-test. 
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When  considering  design  for  a  clinical  trials  more  generally,  we  recommend  assigning  cost  and 
benefits  and  balancing  the  following: 
 
–  Benefit  (or  cost)  of  possible  reduced  (or  increased)  mortality  and  morbidity  from  COVID-19  in 
the  trial  itself. 
–  Cost  of  toxicity  or  side  effects  in  the  trial  itself. 
–  Public  health  benefits  of  learning  that  the  therapy  works,  as  soon  as  possible. 
–  Economic  /  public  confidence  benefits  of  learning  that  the  therapy  works,  as  soon  as  possible. 
–  Benefits  of  learning  that  the  therapy  doesn’t  work,  as  soon  as  possible,  if  it  really  doesn’t  work. 
–  Scientific  insights  gained  from  intermediate  measurements  or  secondary  data  analysis. 
–  Financial  cost  of  the  study  itself,  as  well  as  opportunity  cost  if  it  reduces  your  effort  to  test 
something  else. 
 
This  may  look  like  a  mess—but  if  you’re  not  addressing  these  issues  explicitly,  you’re 
addressing  them  implicitly.  Whatever  therapies  are  being  tried,  should  be  monitored.  Doctors 
should  have  some  freedom  to  experiment,  and  they  should  be  recording  what  happens.  To  put  it 
another  way,  they’re  trying  different  therapies  anyway,  so  let’s  try  to  get  something  useful  out  of 
all  that.  It’s  also  not  just  about  “what  works”  or  “does  a  particular  drug  work,”  but  how  to  go 
about  understanding  what  works,  when,  and  for  whom.   You  want  to  get  something  like  optimal 
dosing,  which  could  depend  on  individuals.   But  you  won't  get  good  discrimination  on  this  from  a 
standard  clinical  trial  or  set  of  clinical  trials.   So  we  have  to  go  beyond  the 
learning-from-clinical-trial  paradigm,  designing  large  studies  that  mix  experiment  and 
observation  to  get  insight  into  dosing,  subgroup  effects,  and  other  practical  questions. 
 
Also,  lots  of  the  relevant  decisions  will  be  made  at  the  system  level,  not  the  individual  level. 
These  issues  of  decision  making  are  crucial,  and  they  go  beyond  the  standard  clinical-trial 
paradigm. 
 
Other  issues  arise  when  designing  clinical  trials  for  vaccines.   Lumley  (2020)  writes: 
 
There  are  over  100  potential  vaccines  being  developed,  and  several  are  already 
in  preliminary  testing  in  humans.  There  are  three  steps  to  testing  a  vaccine: 
showing  that  it  doesn’t  have  any  common,  nasty  side  effects;  showing  that  it 
raises  antibodies;  showing  that  vaccinated  people  don’t  get  COVID-19. 
 
The  last  step  is  the  big  one,  especially  if  you  want  it  fast.  .  .  .  We  don’t  expect 
perfection,  and  if  a  vaccine  truly  reduces  the  infection  rate  by  50%  it  would  be  a 
serious  mistake  to  discard  it  as  useless.  But  if  the  control-group  infection  rate  over 
a  couple  of  months  is  a  high-but-maybe-plausible  0.2%  that  means  600,000 
people  in  the  trial—one  of  the  largest  clinical  trials  in  history. 
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How  can  that  be  reduced?  If  the  trial  was  done  somewhere  with  out-of-control 
disease  transmission,  the  rate  of  infection  in  controls  might  be  5%  and  a 
moderately  large  trial  would  be  sufficient.  But  doing  a  randomised  trial  in  a  setting 
like  that  is  hard—and  ethically  dubious  if  it’s  a  developing-world  population  that 
won’t  be  getting  a  successful  vaccine  any  time  soon.  If  the  trial  took  a  couple  of 
years,  rather  than  a  couple  of  months,  the  infection  rate  could  be  3-4  times 
lower—but  we  can’t  afford  to  wait  a  couple  of  years. 
 
The  other  possibility  is  deliberate  infection.  If  you  deliberately  exposed  trial 
participants  to  the  coronavirus,  you  could  run  a  trial  with  only  hundreds  of 
participants,  and  no  more  COVID  deaths,  in  total,  than  a  larger  trial.  But  signing 
people  up  for  deliberate  exposure  to  a  potentially  deadly  infection  when  half  of 
them  are  getting  placebo  is  something  you  don’t  want  to  do  without  very  careful 
consideration  and  widespread  consultation.  .  .  . 
 
And  Delaney  (2020)  follows  up: 
 
One  major  barrier  is  manufacturing  the  doses,  especially  since  we  decided  to 
off-shore  a  lot  of  our  biomedical  capacity  in  the  name  of  efficiency  (at  the  cost  of 
robustness).  .  .  .  We  want  an  effective  vaccine  and  it  may  be  the  case  that 
candidates  vary  in  their  effectiveness.  There  are  successful  vaccines  that  do  not 
grant  100%  immunity.  The  original  polio  vaccines  were  only  60-70%  effective 
versus  one  of  the  strains,  but  that  still  led  to  a  vast  decrease  in  the  number  of 
infections  in  the  United  States  once  vaccination  became  standard. 
 
So,  clearly  we  want  trials.  .  .  .  Now  we  get  to  the  point  about  medical  ethics.  A 
phase  III  trial  takes  a  long  time  to  conduct  and  there  is  some  political  pressure  for 
a  fast  solution.  .  .  .  if  the  virus  is  mostly  under  control,  you  need  a  lot  of  people 
and  a  long  time  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  a  vaccine.  People  are  rarely 
exposed  so  it  takes  a  long  time  for  differences  in  cases  between  the  arms  to 
show  up.  .  .  . 
 
Another  option  is  the  challenge  trial.  Likely  only  taking  a  few  hundred 
participants,  it  would  have  no  more  deaths  than  a  regular  trial.  But  it  would 
involve  infecting  people,  treated  with  a  placebo(!!),  with  a  potentially  fatal 
infectious  disease.  There  are  greater  good  arguments  here,  but  the  longer  I  think 
about  them  the  more  dubious  they  get  to  me.  Informed  consent  for  things  that  are 
so  dangerous  really  does  suggest  coercion.  .  .  . 
 
It  seems  hard  to  imagine  that  clinical  trials  for  treatments  could  be  organized  efficiently  across 
research  groups,  given  the  current  competitive  nature  of  biomedical  research.   But  maybe  it 
could  be  possible  to  organize  clinical  trials  for  vaccines.   One  advantage  would  be  that  it  should 
not  be  necessary  to  include  a  placebo  arm  with  each  trial. 
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4. Disease  models 
 
Infectious  disease  transmission  models  have  been  held  to  unprecedented  and  deserved 
scrutiny  during  the  COVID-19  crisis.  The  field  of  infectious  disease  modelling  finds  its  roots  in 
the  work  of  Ross  (1910)  on  malaria,  using  mathematical  tools  to  describe  the  complex  relations 
between  parasites,  vectors,  and  hosts.   Ross  defined  the  concept  of  dependent  happenings, 
whereby  the  frequency  of  an  event  such  as  an  infection  in  an  individual  depends  on  the  number 
of  individuals  already  affected  (Halloran,  1991).   Kermack  and  McKendrick  (1927)  formalized 
this  approach,  leading  to  the  development  of  the  SIR  (susceptible-infectious-recovered) 
differential  equation  system  that  is  still  the  basis  of  many  of  the  models  used  for  SARS-CoV-2 
today.   In  the  SIR  model,  the  processes  of  contagion  and  immunity  are  modeled  following  the 
mass  action  principle:   the  incidence  of  new  infections  is  dependent  on  the  proportion  of 
infectious  and  susceptible  individuals  in  the  population,  assuming  homogeneous  mixing.   In  the 
following  decades,  the  field  of  infectious  disease  modeling  has  seen  tremendous  development 
but  has  long  been  kept  separated  from  statistical  modeling  and  inference.   The  focus  was  on 
putting  theory  into  equations  and  exploring  different  scenarios,  leading  to  important 
developments  in  the  development  and  understanding  of  interventions  aimed  at  controlling 
epidemics  such  as  vaccines  or  vector  control.   Until  recently,  comparatively  less  attention  has 
been  given  to  statistical  concepts  such  as  inference,  measurement,  and  uncertainty. 
 
Several  types  of  approaches  have  been  used  to  model  the  transmission  of  SARS-CoV-2, 
depending  on  the  stage  of  the  epidemic  and  the  objectives  of  the  work.  
 
Whether  the  objective  of  a  model  is  inference  or  forecasting,  the  handling  of  uncertainty  should 
remain  a  constant  concern.   We  can  distinguish  three  sources  of  uncertainty.   Stochastic 
uncertainty  arises  from  chance  events  during  the  course  of  transmission  (whether  a  contact 
between  an  infectious  and  a  susceptible  person  will  result  in  transmission)  or  data  generation 
(sampling  variation  in  infected  individuals  that  are  reported  as  cases).   Parameter  uncertainty 
represents  the  imperfect  level  of  knowledge  of  a  particular  quantity,  such  as  the  average 
duration  of  the  incubation  period  which  is  a  fixed  input  parameter  to  most  transmission  models. 
Model  (or  structural)  uncertainty  refers  to  the  set  of  assumptions  underlying  any  modeling 
attempt  and  their  adequacy  to  reality  (Draper,  1995).   To  avoid  overconfidence,  especially  when 
results  are  expected  to  impact  policy,  one  should  acknowledge  and  discuss  the  potential  impact 
of  each  of  these  sources  of  uncertainty,  and  as  often  as  possible  directly  propagate  the 
uncertainty  into  the  results. 
 
In  the  very  early  stages  of  the  emergence  of  SARS-CoV-2  in  Wuhan,  China,  the  focus  has  been 
put  on  estimating  the  basic  reproduction  number  from  surveillance  data  on  cases  of R0
SARS-CoV-2  infection.    is  defined  as  the  average  number  of  secondary  cases  that  are R0
generated  by  an  infectious  individual  in  a  fully  susceptible  population.   In  the  first  few  weeks 
after  its  emergence,  it  was  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  population  was  fully  susceptible  to 
SARS-CoV-2  infection,  allowing  the  use  of  simple  models  based  on  branching  processes  or 
exponential  growth.  Estimating  from  counts  of  reported  cases  constitutes  a  typical  inference R0
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problem  and  must  account  for  important  considerations  regarding  stochastic,  parameter,  and 
model  uncertainty. 
 
In  the  context  of  emerging  pathogens,  stochastic  uncertainty  can  be  very  impactful.   As  very  few 
people  are  affected,  any  outlier  behaviour  may  have  a  strong  impact  on  the  course  of  the 
disease.   One  key  component  here  is  the  assumed  distribution  in  the  number  of  secondary 
cases.  In  a  totally-susceptible  population,  its  average  is  by  definition  ,  but  this  can  vary  from R0
individual  to  individual,  with  the  extreme  being  a  superspreading  event  (defined  as  an  usually 
large  number  of  secondary  cases  generated  by  a  single  infectious  person).   Superspreading 
events  can  have  a  considerable  impact  in  the  early  stages  of  disease  emergence  by 
accelerating  the  spatial  spread  of  the  pathogen,  as  was  seen  for  instance  during  the  emergence 
of  Middle-East  Respiratory  Syndrome  coronavirus  (Kucharski  and  Althaus,  2015).   Individual 
heterogeneity  and  the  potential  for  superspreading  events  can  be  accounted  for  using  a 
negative  binomial  distribution  for  modelling  the  number  of  secondary  cases  (Lloyd-Smith  et  al., 
2005). 
 
Estimating  using  data  from  the  early  incidence  of  SARS-CoV-2  infection  in  Wuhan  also R0
carries  the  problems  of  parameter  and  model  uncertainty.   Examining  the  mechanisms  leading 
to  the  generation  of  count  data  gives  insight  about  the  basic  assumptions  that  will  explicitly  or 
implicitly  be  part  of  any  modeling  attempt:   (1)  an  initial  zoonotic  event  led  to  the  infection  of  a 
number  of  humans  on  a  given  date;  (2)  each  of  these  cases  generated  secondary  cases  ( R0
cases  on  average,  with  a  distribution  as  discussed  above);  (3)  each  of  these  secondary  cases 
generated  cases,  with  a  delay  that  corresponds  to  the  generation  time  (the  gap  between  two 
successive  generations  of  cases,  which  also  is  a  random  variable,  not  a  constant);  (4)  infected 
cases  will  have  an  incubation  period,  some  of  the  cases  will  have  symptoms,  some  of  the 
symptomatic  cases  will  seek  care,  some  of  the  patients  will  be  tested  and  diagnosed,  some  of 
the  diagnosed  will  be  reported  to  the  authorities  and  counted  as  a  case.   From  these 
observations,  we  understand  that  is  not  possible  to  estimate  at  the  same  time    the  date  and R0
size  of  the  initial  zoonotic  event,  the  incubation  period,  and  the  generation  time  from  information 
about  the  incidence  of  SARS-CoV-2,  as  several  combinations  of  these  parameters  may  lead  to 
the  same  data.   To  estimate  ,  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  bring  external  information  about  the R0
other  parameters.   Here  enters  parameter  uncertainty,  as  overconfidence  about  the  initial 
conditions  or  the  generation  time  would  result  in  overconfidence  about  the  value  of  . R0
 
Thinking  about  the  mechanisms  of  data  generation  brings  further  considerations  about  model 
uncertainty.  To  this  day,  very  few  details  are  known  about  the  situation  surrounding  the 
emergence  of  SARS-CoV-2  in  Wuhan  at  the  end  of  2019.   Putting  aside  any  political  aspect,  the 
early  phase  of  emergence  of  an  unknown  pathogen  is  always  a  chaotic  matter.   Explicitly  or 
implicitly,  modeling  the  transmission  of  SARS-CoV-2  in  this  context  will  require  strong 
assumptions  about  how  this  data  was  generated.   For  instance,  some  authors  took  the  number 
of  reported  cases  in  Wuhan  in  the  first  few  weeks  at  face  value  and  directly  inferred  the  rate  of 
exponential  growth  and  thus  ,  implicitly  assuming  that  the  proportion  of  ascertainment  (the R0
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proportion  of  cases  that  end  up  in  the  data)  was  constant  over  the  period  considered  (Majumder 
and  Mandi,  2020,  Li  et  al.,  2020).   Other  authors  made  explicit  assumptions  about  the  shape  of 
variation  of  ascertainment  with  time  (Zhao  et  al.,  2020).   Rather  than  making  assumptions  about 
ascertainment  in  Wuhan,  other  authors  prefered  to  use  data  on  national  and  international  cases 
of  SARS-CoV-2  identified  in  areas  still  unaffected  by  the  turmoil  together  with  traffic  data  (Read, 
2020,  Riou  and  Althaus,  2020,  Imai  et  al.,  2020).   However,  this  approach  carries  other 
assumptions  about  the  representativity  of  people  who  traveled  from  Wuhan  to  other  places. 
Differences  across  estimates  based  on  different  assumptions  may  be  referred  to  as  model 
uncertainty,  and  is  in  itself  a  good  reason  to  consider  multiple  approaches  to  study  the  same 
issue. 
 
Beyond  the  first  few  weeks  following  emergence,  it  becomes  more  and  more  difficult  to  continue 
to  assume  that  transmission  continues  to  take  place  unhindered.  Whether  the  objective  is 
prediction  on  inference,  it  becomes  crucial  to  account  for  immunity,  social  distancing  or  control 
measures  in  addition  to  just  contagion.   Two  broad  categories  of  transmission  models  are 
adapted  to  this  task.   Agent-based  models  are  used  to  simulate  the  individual  behaviour  of 
agents  and  can  get  as  intricate  as  imaginable,  going  as  far  as  to  simulate  every  vehicle  moving 
in  a  country  (Abhari,  Marini,  and  Chokan,  2020).   These  models  can  provide  insight  but  can  be 
difficult  or  impossible  to  fit  to  data.   In  contrast,  compartmental  models  divide  the  population  into 
different  states  (e.g.  susceptible,  infectious,  and  removed  for  the  classical  SIR  model),  without 
considering  any  difference  among  individuals  within  a  state.   Compartmental  models  may  be 
considered  within  a  stochastic  or  a  deterministic  framework.   The  stochastic  framework 
considers  the  probability  of  occurrence  of  each  event  at  each  time  step,  and  as  hinted  by  its 
name  is  better  suited  to  handle  stochastic  uncertainty.   The  deterministic  framework  relies  upon 
solving  systems  of  ordinary  differential  equations  (ODE)  and  leads  to  the  same  average  results 
when  the  number  of  infected  is  sufficiently  large.   The  reduction  in  computational  cost 
associated  with  solving  ODEs  instead  of  simulating  a  large  number  of  events  is  important  when 
the  objective  is  inference,  for  example  when  using  Bayesian  software  such  as  Stan  (Stan 
Development  Team,  2020). 
 
In  addition  to  these  two  approaches  a  third  approach  that  is  more  empirically  based  was 
developed  and  publicized  by  the  Institute  for  Health  Metrics  and  Evaluation  (IHME).   The  IHME 
model  assumed  a  Gaussian  curve  for  the  shape  of  the  epidemic’s  mortality  trajectory, 
empirically  estimated  how  restrictions  including  social  distancing  enacted  in  China  impacted  the 
time  to  and  height  of  the  peak,  and  then  extrapolated  to  other  settings  on  the  basis  of  their 
accumulating  mortality  data.   The  symmetry  assumption  coupled  with  the  rapid  rise  in  cases  and 
deaths  in  almost  every  region,  meant  that  the  IHME  model  predicted  a  much  more  rapid  decline 
than  other  models.   As  the  virus  spread  across  the  U.S.  it  became  clear  that  the  model  was  not 
correct  and  the  IHME  recently  revised  the  model,  replacing  it  with  a  hybrid 
empirical-compartmental  approach. 
 
As  model  complexity  increases,  the  proper  handling  of  uncertainty  becomes  even  more 
essential.   Model  predictions  should  incorporate  stochastic  uncertainty  by  including  prediction 
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intervals.   Parameter  uncertainty  should  directly  be  propagated  in  the  results.   The  quantification 
of  uncertainty  in  the  model  outcomes  is  an  integral  part  of  the  results  and  should  not  be 
relegated  to  the  side  as  sensitivity  analyses.   In  this  regard,  the  Bayesian  framework  with  its 
focus  on  parameter  probability  distributions  is  attractive.   Model  uncertainty  can  be  handled  by 
carefully  considering  whether  the  model  structure  and  all  relevant  assumptions  (even  implicit) 
are  adapted  to  the  question  as  well  as  using  technical  tools  such  as  stacking  (Liu  et  al.,  2018). 
Conducting  sensitivity  analyses  with  alternative  models  is  always  sensible,  but  there  is  only  so 
much  than  a  team  can  do  about  its  own  model.   It  is  advisable  to  rely  on  other  researchers  and 
experts  to  provide  critical  assessment  of  the  model  by  releasing  code  and  data  on  an 
appropriate  platform.   Model  uncertainty  is  best  assessed  by  the  community,  and  this  requires 
transparency.   Code  sharing  will  also  bring  to  academia  much-needed  good  practices  for 
programming,  and  in  the  long  run  build  more  confidence  in  the  field  of  infectious  disease 
modeling.   Additionally,  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  the  biases  associated  with  some 
approaches,  as  for  instance,  fitting  to  cumulative  incidence  curves  is  known  to  lead  to  bias  and 
overconfidence  (King  et  al.,  2015). 
 
5. Statistical  analysis 
 
So  far  we  have  discussed  accounting  for  uncertainty  in  design,  data,,  and  modeling  of 
epidemics.   In  addition,  data  analysis  can  account  for  uncertainty  and  variation  using  multilevel 
modeling  all  the  way,  and  decision  making  can  be  based  on  costs  and  benefits,  not  statistical 
significance.   We  have  relatively  little  to  say  about  statistical  analysis  because  this  is  one  area  in 
which  there  are  readily-available  tools  to  handle  uncertainty  and  variation. 
 
We  are  aware  of  several  coronavirus  analyses  that  make  use  of  multilevel  models  and  Bayesian 
inference.   Unwin  et  al.  (2020)  is  an  analysis  by  the  Imperial  College  group  that  partially  pools 
across  U.S.  states,  and  they  have  done  similar  analyses  for  Europe  (Flaxman  et  al.,  2020, 
Vollmer  et  al.,  2020).   Gelman  and  Carpenter  (2020)  reanalyze  the  Santa  Clara  antibody  study 
using  a  hierarchical  Bayesian  model  to  account  for  variation  of  test  specificities  and  sensitivities. 
A  partial  list  of  coronavirus  projects  using  the  Bayesian  inference  engine  Stan  appears  at  Stan 
Forums  (2020).   Bayesian  analysis  can  also  be  performed  in  the  data  collection  stage,  allowing 
more  efficient  designs  (Harrell,  2020). 
 
A  challenging  issue  with  statistical  models  fit  during  an  ongoing  epidemic  is  unobserved/partially 
observed  data.   This  isn’t  that  much  of  an  issue  with  deterministic  population-level  models,  but  it 
wreaks  havoc  on  stochastic  differential  equation  models  and  individual-level  approaches.   As  a 
result,  deterministic  models  have  had  wide  influence,  despite  their  weaknesses  and  often  in 
situations  where  demographic  stochasticity  of  the  transmission  process  should  be  accounted 
for,  along  with  the  impact  of  individual-level  variation  on  outcomes. 
 
Early  statistical  inferences  for  epidemic  models  were  actually  rooted  in  a  stochastic  approach 
known  as  the  TSIR  (time-series  SIR)  model  which  was  originally  used  to  account  for 
time-varying  birthrates  and  demographic  stochasticity  in  models  of  measles  transmission  (see 
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Wakefield  et  al.,  2018),  but  this  has  been  surpassed  by  far  more  complex,  far  less 
understandable  approaches.   An  appealing  aspect  of  the  TSIR  is  that  it  is  just  a  transformation 
of  a  regression  model  and  so  is  accessible  to  researchers  and  policymakers  with  statistical 
training. 
 
6. Communication 
 
To  effectively  communicate  the  results  of  analyses  conducted  during  the  pandemic,  what  they 
are  meant  to  accomplish  needs  to  be  clear.   In  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  this 
raises  the  problem  of  effective  scientific  communication  to  the  central  place  it  has  always 
belonged.   This  includes  communication  of  key  dimensions  of  uncertainty  in  risk.   One  of  the 
key  challenges  here  is  familiar:   how  does  one  impart  a  gestalt  understanding  of  an  interval 
statistic,  such  as  a  confidence  or  credible  interval,  to  as  broad  of  an  audience  as  possible  (van 
der  Bles  et  al.,  2020)?   Another  challenge  relates  to  communication  of  the  different  ways  in 
which  uncertainty  arises  and  the  difficulty  of  picking  one  apart  from  another.   For  example,  what 
do  we  do  when  we  can’t  figure  out  if  we’re  seeing  the  results  of  process  noise,  observation 
noise,  observation  bias,  or  some  combination  thereof? 
 
Much  of  the  controversy  surrounding  the  multiple  transmission  models  used  for  prediction  and 
planning  could  be  mitigated  by  a  more  pragmatic  reframing  of  what  these—and  all  mathematical 
and  statistical  models—are  all  about.   Namely,  they  distill  assumptions  and  data  into  inferences 
for  outcomes  of  interest.   Understood  this  way,  they  are  primarily  tools  for  dimension  reduction 
and  exploration,  rather  than  divining  rods.   Nonetheless,  there  are  political  and  emotional 
reasons  people  may  glom  on  to  one  model  or  another,  that  make  a  more  measured  appreciation 
of  the  ability  of  models  to  dispel  uncomfortable  or  politically  inconvenient  uncertainty,  unlikely  to 
be  broadly  achieved  any  time  soon.   Nonetheless,  individual  scientists  have  to  balance  the 
career  and  emotional  imperatives  to  deliver  impactful,  influential  results  with  a  more 
realistic—and  less  "scientistic"—take  on  what  it  is  that  we  are  doing. 
 
We  have  also  seen  some  high-priority  junk  science,  such  as  extreme  results  reported  from  small 
uncontrolled  trials,  an  observational  study  that  may  have  been  based  on  fake  data,  and  a 
leaching  of  trust  from  formerly  respected  institutions  such  as  the  Center  for  Disease  Control,  the 
World  Health  Organization,  and  leading  universities  and  medical  journals.   It  is  good  news  that 
bad  research  can  be  rapidly  debunked  on  social  media,  but  it  is  not  clear  what  the  new 
equilibrium  will  be.   Going  beyond  problems  with  individual  studies,  we  recommend  more 
emphasis  on  accurately  communicating  uncertainty  in  model  inferences  and  predictions,  as 
discussed  for  example  by  Hullman  et  al.  (2019). 
 
In  Etzioni  (2020)  we  explain  our  discomfort  with  communication  of  model-based  projections  from 
the  IHME:   the  issue  is  not  just  with  the  model  but  also  with  how  any  changes  in  projections 
based  on  updating  the  inputs  or  the  model  itself  were  reported.  In  the  case  of  the  IHME,  the 
model  is  an  empirical  model,  so  its  projections  kept  changing  as  the  model  adapted  to 
accumulating  data  on  the  epidemic  in  the  United  States.   Ultimately,  it  became  clear  that  key 
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model  assumptions  rendered  it  incorrect  for  making  such  projections  and  the  model  itself  was 
completely  revised,  changing  the  projected  cumulative  deaths  considerably.   In  and  of  itself,  this 
demonstrated  the  uncertainty  inherent  in  the  model.   But  the  new  projections  were  not  attributed 
to  the  uncertainty  or  the  model.   They  were  attributed  to  states  beginning  to  relax  social 
distancing.   This  interpretation  not  only  lends  itself  to  politicization,  it  completely  understates  the 
uncertainty  in  the  model,  suggesting  not  only  that  the  updated  projection  is  correct,  but  that  the 
previous  projection  was  as  well.  
 
One  thing  we  keep  hearing  in  conversations  with  state  government  officials  is  a  concern  that 
people  just  don’t  understand  when  they  are  at  risk.   Maps  and  other  visuals  can   give  a  realistic 
and  visceral  sense  of  what  that  risk  looks  like.   Many  questions  of  science  communication  arise 
here  that  relate  specifically  to  the  translation  of  theory  into  models  and  models  into  spoken  and 
written  language.   Meanwhile,  pundits  and  public  intellectuals  muddy  the  waters  by  naively 
interpreting  the  psychology  literature  on  risk  perception  and  not  taking  into  account  the 
unpredictability  of  contagion;  see  Epstein  (2020)  and  Sunstein  (2020)  for  examples  of  such 
punditry  and  Douglass  (2020)  and  Cirillo  and  Taleb  (2020)  for  criticisms  of  shallow  individualistic 
risk  analysis. 
 
Another  problem  relates  to  the  communication  of  uncertainty  in  the  structure  of  the  models 
themselves.   We've  seen  an  appetite  both  from  the  public  and  from  modelers  themselves  to  find 
the  one  true  model,  with  that  Box  quote  (which,  like  the  term  "social  distancing,"  we  hope  never 
to  hear  again  after  this  year)  tacked  on  to  papers  and  talks  as  a  kind  of  fig  leaf.   The  modeling 
literature  in  epidemiology  for  the  large  part  focuses  on  validating  models  through  the  fit  of  the 
curve  to  the  data  and  demonstrating  some  accuracy  in  short-term  temporal  prediction.   But 
researchers  have  traditionally  been  far  less  interested  in  dealing  with  the  distribution  of  infection 
in  the  population.   Hierarchical  models  for  examining  both  individual  level  and  ecological 
outcomes  are  important,  as  would  an  in-depth  discussion  of  how  to  align  model  validation  with 
public  health  goals:   should  our  model  maximize  short  term  prediction  at  the  population  level  or 
give  a  better  long-term  sense  of  who  will  be  at  risk  in  terms  of  demographic  and  geographic 
characteristics. 
 
7. Information  aggregation  and  decision  making 
 
At  the  time  of  this  writing,  there  is  vigorous  debate  in  the  news  media,  social  media,  and 
governments  regarding  possible  future  paths  of  the  epidemic  and  how  best  to  mitigate  it.   In  the 
United  States,  these  disputes  have  taken  on  a  political  dimension:   major  politicians  in  both 
parties  have  oscillated  between  complacency  and  hysteria,  and  a  persistent  partisan  divide  has 
emerged  around  both  the  perception  of  risk  and  the  use  of  protective  equipment  such  as  masks. 
There  has  also  been  a  shift  from  an  initial  phase  of  transmission  in  more  densely-populated 
urban  and  suburban  areas,  to  growth  in  more  rural  areas  with  different  issues  relating  to 
healthcare  access,  patterns  of  contact,  and  underlying  vulnerabilities  to  infection  and  severe 
disease  relating  to  age  and  comorbidities.   Globally,  too,  the  pandemic  has  begun  to  drift 
southward,  with  recent  surges  in  transmission  in  Latin  America  and  South  Asia. 
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Here,  though,  we  focus  on  the  statistical  question  of  combining  multiple  sources  of  uncertain 
information.   On  the  risk  side  is  the  news  of  uncontrolled  spread  of  the  virus  in  early  2020  in 
Wuhan  and  then  northern  Italy,  followed  by  the  scary  charts  showing  a  doubling  every  few  days 
during  the  period  when  most  of  the  world  was  conducting  business  as  usual.   On  the  "don't 
panic"  side  are  the  many  countries  around  the  world,  and  many  states  within  the  U.S.,  which  still 
have  seen  very  few  coronavirus  cases  and  whose  hospitals  have  not  been  overwhelmed.  
 
One  thing  that  troubled  us  in  the  earliest  phases  of  the  pandemic  response  was  the  emphasis 
on  rapid  analysis  of  complex,  incomplete  datasets,  followed  by  rapid  publication  and  extensive 
media  coverage.   Rapid  response  is  not  inherently  problematic,  but  the  conjuring  of  theoretical 
frameworks  and  analytic  tools  on  the  fly  is  unlikely  to  benefit  many  more  people  than  the 
authors  of  the  study.   Instead,  this  makes  more  sense  when  you  have  an  existing  framework 
and  set  of  tools  that  you  can  apply  with  minor  modifications  to  incoming  data,  as  was  the  case 
with  a  number  of  groups  enlisted  in  the  earliest  days  of  the  pandemic,  including  IHME  as  well  as 
Imperial  and  other  groups. 
 
This  leads  us  to  wonder  whether  some  kind  of  disaster  model  pre-registration  is  in  order  for 
future  events,  so  that  the  generic  behavior  of  the  set  of  potential  tools  is  well  understood  before 
being  pressed  into  services.   This  could  be  looser  than  a  clinical  trial  registration  but  at  least 
gives  the  key  data  inputs  and  outputs  and  some  characterization  of  expected  behavior  under 
different  scenarios.   Critically,  some  type  of  standardization  would  give  the  ability  to  engineer 
connections  between  different  types  of  analyses,  so  that  information  on,  for  example,  variable 
PCR  testing  across  geographic  areas  and  demographic  groups,  can  be  easily  used  to  inform 
estimates  of  disease  incidence  and  prevalence.  
 
This  takes  us  back  to  the  motivating  question  behind  this  essay:  How  can  we  adequately 
account  for  uncertainty  in  a  pandemic?   The  question  is  probably  better  reframed  as:   How  can 
we  be  better  prepared  to  address  the  uncertainty  inherent  in  the  response  to  the  next  pandemic 
or  another  catastrophic,  unforeseen—but  foreseeable—event.   An  answer  to  this  question  may 
lie  in  a  reimagining  of  the  tools  of  epidemiological  modeling  from  something  that  looks  a  bit 
more  like  the  engineering  perspective  and  a  bit  less  like  the  "pure  science"  perspective.   This 
entails  a  move  away  from  analyses  as  one-off  exercises  that  uncover  some  permanent—or  at 
least  durable—truth,  towards  a  more  software-like,  continuous-improvement  conception  of  the 
products  of  statistical  analysis.  
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